It Was Inevitable

[JackC]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101123/wl ... 1123092327

So North Korea has now openly attacked the South. War is on the way, unless people are so stupid as to submit to North Korea's blackmail yet again.

[Cosima___J]

Scarey stuff, Jack!

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/23 ... ry-island/

[John F]

Not a chance. There won't be another Korean war unless North Korea crosses the DMZ. Yeonpyeong is a tiny island with maybe 1,000 inhabitants, much closer to the North Korean mainland than the South Korean, and has been the subject of a border dispute of many years and two naval clashes. These haven't been a casus belli, and this peculiar artillery attack shouldn't be either.

[JackC]

Not a chance.

That's the same thing people have been saying after each provocation. Well, the bombs are falling now, so "not a chance" seems a little silly.

[Cosima___J]

Fortunately, you are probably right John F.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AM2NT20101123

[Agnes Selby]

Perhaps not as simple as JohnF proposes.

http:// http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/ ... 185my.html

[jbuck919]

Perhaps not as simple as JohnF proposes.

http:// http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/ ... 185my.html

Nothing in that article proposes consequences more dire than those in the article cited by Cosima, or suggests that anything resembling war is imminent. Responsible journalism is rightly limiting itself to these kinds of speculations, though with respect to some of them the astute reader might receive the unstated message, "Your guess is as good as mine."

[Agnes Selby]

Perhaps not as simple as JohnF proposes.

http:// http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/ ... 185my.html

Nothing in that article proposes consequences more dire than those in the article cited by Cosima, or suggests that anything resembling war is imminent. Responsible journalism is rightly limiting itself to these kinds of speculations, though with respect to some of them the astute reader might receive the unstated message, "Your guess is as good as mine."

Well, in that case there is no problem whatsoever. The South Koreans will
just sit back while their few inhabitants (say the measly 1000) will be killed.
All Obama has to do now is to give another speech and all will be well (just as
the Story-Lady said).

[HoustonDavid]

Agnes, surely you're not posturing for the situation to escalate into a war? I think
the world would much prefer talking than fighting. The experts I've read seem to
agree that it is another case of posturing by the north to get the world's attention,
something they do on a regular basis.

[Barry]

I don't think anyone WANTS a full-scale war. But the problem is that if nothing involving force is done in response (by the South; not us), North Korea's leadership will get the message that they can get away with this sort of thing scott-free. Then what will they do the next time they want to get everyone's attention?

At the very least, there should be no return to negotiations that could result in any sort of easing of pressure against the North any time soon. If that's what they were hoping to accompish with this stunt, it's vital to make sure they don't succeed.

[jbuck919]

I don't think anyone WANTS a full-scale war. But the problem is that if nothing involving force is done in response (by the South; not us), North Korea's leadership will get the message that they can get away with this sort of thing scott-free. Then what will they do the next time they want to get everyone's attention?

It is hard to know what the South might come up with as a retaliatory measure that the North would not respond to as though it were the initial provocation, leading to one thing after another and perhaps serious escalation. This is not the same as saying that the South should not retaliate. Maybe they'll pull a blockade of Cuba out of the hat.

[Agnes Selby]

http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/ ... 186lp.html

[HoustonDavid]

David Sanger, the New York Times expert on North Korea, pretty much agrees with
Peter Hartcher of the Sydney Morning Herald: North Korea is lining up Kim Jung-il's
successor, his son Kim Jong-un, and giving him a military send-off in defiance of
neighboring South Korea and the United States. Their only partner, communist China,
is calling for a measured and diplomatic approach and a renewal of talks. The United
States appears to be avoiding any military rejoinder, although the South Koreans are
threatening retaliation.

According to the SM Herald: "South Korea's president Lee Myung Bak campaigned on
taking a firmer line on North Korea. But while he is threatening retaliation in case of
further aggression, he is showing considerable restraint. So is the US."

I certainly agree, walking softly at this point is a great deal smarter than provoking a
rogue nuclear power into further acts of aggression, or selling nuclear technology to other
rogue states or even terrorists. They have already sold Syria the technology to build a
reactor; we don't need them to help someone else in that powder keg part of the world.

[piston]

I wonder what North Korea would do if one were to use the old-fashioned propaganda technique of flying stealth bombers far overhead and dropping goodies downstairs: chocolate, gushers, yu know? the kind of stuff a four year old loves! Add to this a few brochures of what life could be and keep dropping this stuff until they protest......

[Barry]

I'm not surprised China is calling for a return to talks. For one thing, they have their own disputes over islands with Japan and I'm sure they don't want a precedent established where by outside powers take a strong stand in such situations.

But as I said before, even if there is no military response, at the very least, there should be no diplomatic rewards offered for North Korea's behavior. Rather than easing sanctions that are already in place, they should be toughened. There needs to be a price paid for these types of actions.

[John F]

And then there's this:

The attack on Yeonpyeong Island occurred after South Korean forces on exercises fired test shots into waters near the North Korean coast.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/opinion/24wed1.html

[living_stradivarius]

Now is a good time for South Koreans to evacuate (quietly), especially given their rising domestic food prices. Then, we strike.

[jbuck919]

And then there's this:

The attack on Yeonpyeong Island occurred after South Korean forces on exercises fired test shots into waters near the North Korean coast.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/opinion/24wed1.html

Well, let's not settle for the simple explanation when miles of speculation will do.

Now is a good time for South Koreans to evacuate (quietly), especially given their rising domestic food prices. Then, we strike.

If there were even a hint of a threat of a possibility of an all-out conflict, the first thing you would hear is that the U.S. Army families were being evacuated (yes, they're there along with their DoDDS-schooled kids).

[living_stradivarius]

If there were even a hint of a threat of a possibility of an all-out conflict, the first thing you would hear is that the U.S. Army families were being evacuated (yes, they're there along with their DoDDS-schooled kids).

And maybe they are evacuating right now without media scrutiny. That would be best.

[Cosima___J]

Here is an important question:

If this situation turns into a full blown war, what will the US do? Since we have troops in South Korea, are we committed to protecting the South by whatever means necessary? If only we could know what goes on in the minds of Kim Jong-Il and the heir apparent. Does the younger Kim just want to show his own people, the South and the world that he's a tough guy? Or what?

[jbuck919]

Here is an important question:

If this situation turns into a full blown war, what will the US do? Since we have troops in South Korea, are we committed to protecting the South by whatever means necessary? If only we could know what goes on in the minds of Kim Jong-Il and the heir apparent. Does the younger Kim just want to show his own people, the South and the world that he's a tough guy? Or what?

Reports indicate that the South Koreans are not losing any sleep over this, and as busy as you are with family and life and Thanksgiving and all that, neither should you (meant solicitously and not sarcastically).

[John F]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

(As far as I know, there aren't any U.S. Army dependents living in Korea. There certainly weren't when I was stationed in Uijongbu and Daegu, before moving on to Germany. That's why the tour of duty in Korea is limited to 1 year and is unofficially called a hardship tour. However, the U.S. embassy and other American civilian offices would need to be evacuated in the event of war, and that would provide the advance notice jbuck919 is speaking of.)

[living_stradivarius]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

or 1-2 AMERICAN casualties

[JackC]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

That's just absurd. Do you think South Korea would sit back and do nothing if the North were to launch constant, but less than "full-scale" or "massive" attacks, just because the US doesn't want to go to war?? What kind of ally would we be if we told South Korea that it had to endure that just because WE were not prepared to go to war?

There is a point beyond which war open war will break out, even if we don't want it.

[JackC]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 05808.html

And now our very own village idiot, Jimmy Carter, sees that North Korea wants to "negotiate." How did we ever manage to survive this moron as President. Oh well, at least his incompetence and idiocy made Reagan possible.

The worst possible thing that could be done would be to reward these acts of war by North Korea by entering into yet another round of negotiations. That's why Jimmy Carter thinks it's a good idea.

Someone better send a clear, unmistakable message to North JKorea soon that they are about to force South Korea into war in which we would join, and that Kim Jong Il and his heir apparent sons would last about as long as Saddam if war breaks out. That is the only thing that will accomplish anything.

[John F]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

That's just absurd. Do you think South Korea would sit back and do nothing if the North were to launch constant, but less than "full-scale" or "massive" attacks, just because the US doesn't want to go to war?? What kind of ally would we be if we told South Korea that it had to endure that just because WE were not prepared to go to war?

There is a point beyond which war open war will break out, even if we don't want it.

Yes, South Korea will indeed not go to war without the concurrence of the U.S. They won't "do nothing," indeed they returned North Korean fire in this new incident, but what they do will be carefully coordinated with the U.S. and will not amount to what we would call a war. You can take that to the bank.

[jbuck919]

And now our very own village idiot, Jimmy Carter, sees that North Korea wants to "negotiate." How did we ever manage to survive this moron as President. Oh well, at least his incompetence and idiocy made Reagan possible.

Surely the worst effective, as opposed to hypothetical, outcome of his failures.

As far as I know, there aren't any U.S. Army dependents living in Korea. There certainly weren't when I was stationed in Uijongbu and Daegu, before moving on to Germany.

Sorry John, but that was then and this is now. I only happen to know about it because I worked for DoDDS (Department of Defense Dependents Schools) in Germany and met teachers who had taught in Korea. A Google search on something like "US Army dependents Korea" turns up numerous hits.

or 1-2 AMERICAN casualties

Not even then, though that would make the situation greatly more complicated and difficult to address. Besides, it is extremely unlikely. Force protection is the number one priority of the U.S. armed forces stationed abroad. The North Koreans would have to go so far out of their way to get to an American that we would already be in the middle of a war precipitated by something else by the time they got there.

[Barry]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

That's just absurd. Do you think South Korea would sit back and do nothing if the North were to launch constant, but less than "full-scale" or "massive" attacks, just because the US doesn't want to go to war?? What kind of ally would we be if we told South Korea that it had to endure that just because WE were not prepared to go to war?

There is a point beyond which war open war will break out, even if we don't want it.

See Israel. I'm sure we didn't want them going to war with Hezbollah or Hamas in spite of the constant provocations from those sources. But eventually, Israel felt they had no choice. And from what I've been reading, it's probably going to happen again with Hezbollah in the not-too-distant future.

Although Hezbollah and Hamas don't have nuclear weapons. So there is an added factor to consider in this case.

Still, if this type of thing were to start happening more frequently, I doubt war could be avoided.

[Agnes Selby]

I am glad to see that Obama has taken an interest in this deadly incident.
Maybe it will prevent an escalation for the time being.

http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-warships ... 187hb.html

[John F]

As far as I know, there aren't any U.S. Army dependents living in Korea. There certainly weren't when I was stationed in Uijongbu and Daegu, before moving on to Germany.

Sorry John, but that was then and this is now. I only happen to know about it because I worked for DoDDS (Department of Defense Dependents Schools) in Germany and met teachers who had taught in Korea. A Google search on something like "US Army dependents Korea" turns up numerous hits.

Now you mention it, things have indeed changed. A 12-month tour of duty in Korea is still unaccompanied by dependents, but GIs assigned to certain geographical areas can now opt for a 24- or 36-month tour and the Army will "sponsor" their dependents (to the tune of a princely $300 a month to pay for their own housing on the economy). So in case of hostilities or the threat of them, yes, a few thousand dependents of the American military will need to be evacuated. As well as the dependents of civilian government employees, and a good many of the employees themselves.

[John F]

See Israel. I'm sure we didn't want them going to war with Hezbollah or Hamas in spite of the constant provocations from those sources. But eventually, Israel felt they had no choice. And from what I've been reading, it's probably going to happen again with Hezbollah in the not-too-distant future.

Although Hezbollah and Hamas don't have nuclear weapons. So there is an added factor to consider in this case.

Still, if this type of thing were to start happening more frequently, I doubt war could be avoided.

Israel is not analogous to South Korea, as they have no mutual defense treaty with the U.S. (or any other country) that would constrain their decision whether to go to war.

[Barry]

See Israel. I'm sure we didn't want them going to war with Hezbollah or Hamas in spite of the constant provocations from those sources. But eventually, Israel felt they had no choice. And from what I've been reading, it's probably going to happen again with Hezbollah in the not-too-distant future.

Although Hezbollah and Hamas don't have nuclear weapons. So there is an added factor to consider in this case.

Still, if this type of thing were to start happening more frequently, I doubt war could be avoided.

Israel is not analogous to South Korea, as they have no mutual defense treaty with the U.S. (or any other country) that would constrain their decision whether to go to war.

The arrangement between the U.S. and Israel is such that a formal treaty isn't necessary. They stayed out of the first Gulph War at our request and allowed us to respond to Saddam's scuds on their behalf in spite of the lack of a formal treaty.

Besides, a mutual defense treaty generally obligates a country to go to war under certain sets of circumstances. It doesn't prevent one party from going to war in the absence of permission from the treaty's other party.

[John F]

The arrangement between the U.S. and Israel is such that a formal treaty isn't necessary. They stayed out of the first Gulph War at our request and allowed us to respond to Saddam's scuds on their behalf in spite of the lack of a formal treaty.

Immaterial. Nations don't have to have treaties to make such arrangements.

Besides, a mutual defense treaty generally obligates a country to go to war under certain sets of circumstances. It doesn't prevent one party from going to war in the absence of permission from the treaty's other party.

That's not consistent with what this treaty actually says. :

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and an governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV
The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

etc. etc.

[Barry]

Point taken on the treaty's language. I was obviously wrong about what it said. Although South Korea may have already violated article I with their "threats" of force outside of any UN process or approval. In fact, both the U.S. and the South have probably violated that clause of the treaty on many occasions since it was signed.

I agree with you that South Korea and the U.S. will likely agree on when and to what extent force should be used if further attacks come from North Korea (they've already agreed on war games).

However, if we're wrong about that, and: a. the North escalates tensions with further attacks, and b. the South feels they have no choice but to respond with force but the U.S. disagrees with them and pushes for avoiding a military conflict at all costs, it's unlikely that the treaty will win out over the South's security fears (I'm assuming here that the U.S. won't offer to fight the North on the South's behalf). The reason for that is that while the language you posted looks nice in print, no country is going to put a piece of paper - especially one over a half century old - over their national security if they genuinely feel they're faced with a choice of adhering strictly to a treaty with another nation or sitting back and allowing an aggressive neighbor to use their land and people for target practice.

Sure ... the South would consult with the U.S. as the treaty mandates. But if they can't agree, the South will do what they feel they must; just like any country would in such circumstances. Do you have any doubt that we'd do the same if the shoe is ever on the other foot and the South tries to veto our desire to use force in the Pacific region when our leadership feels it's necessary?

[living_stradivarius]

South Korea won't go to war against the North without the agreement and participation of the United States - not with nearly 30,000 American combat and support troops stationed in South Korea, mainly in the northern third. And that agreement and participation will not be forthcoming short of a full-scale invasion or massive air attack on the major cities of South Korea from the North.

That's just absurd. Do you think South Korea would sit back and do nothing if the North were to launch constant, but less than "full-scale" or "massive" attacks, just because the US doesn't want to go to war?? What kind of ally would we be if we told South Korea that it had to endure that just because WE were not prepared to go to war?

There is a point beyond which war open war will break out, even if we don't want it.

See Israel. I'm sure we didn't want them going to war with Hezbollah or Hamas in spite of the constant provocations from those sources. But eventually, Israel felt they had no choice. And from what I've been reading, it's probably going to happen again with Hezbollah in the not-too-distant future.

Although Hezbollah and Hamas don't have nuclear weapons. So there is an added factor to consider in this case.

Still, if this type of thing were to start happening more frequently, I doubt war could be avoided.

Not many South Korean politicians in the US lobbying for Seoul though

[Barry]

See Israel.

Not many South Korean politicians in the US lobbying for Seoul though

Good point. Although it's a largely Christian nation going up against a Communist (in other words, Atheist) country. Seems like a natural fit for some of the pro-Israel crowd in Congress.

[John F]

I agree with you that South Korea and the U.S. will likely agree on when and to what extent force should be used if further attacks come from North Korea (they've already agreed on war games).

However, if we're wrong about that, and: a. the North escalates tensions with further attacks, and b. the South feels they have no choice but to respond with force but the U.S. disagrees with them and pushes for avoiding a military conflict at all costs, it's unlikely that the treaty will win out over the South's security fears (I'm assuming here that the U.S. won't offer to fight the North on the South's behalf). The reason for that is that while the language you posted looks nice in print, no country is going to put a piece of paper - especially one over a half century old - over their national security if they genuinely feel they're faced with a choice of adhering strictly to a treaty with another nation or sitting back and allowing an aggressive neighbor to use their land and people for target practice.

Sure ... the South would consult with the U.S. as the treaty mandates. But if they can't agree, the South will do what they feel they must; just like any country would in such circumstances. Do you have any doubt that we'd do the same if the shoe is ever on the other foot and the South tries to veto our desire to use force in the Pacific region when our leadership feels it's necessary?

You, and we, are getting into contingencies here that go way beyond the case at hand. And I think your observations are too abstract, and may not fit the specifics of South Korean governance and politics, which few of us here know anything about beyond what we can read in Wikipedia. If indeed anybody has taken the trouble - I see little if any evidence of it in this discussion.

Some folks in this discussion have been carrying on as if South Korea were like the United States, and the North's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island were the equivalent of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which precipitated us into World War II. But of course they are quite unlike. The attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't a provocation, it was an act of war aimed at our Pacific fleet and close to putting it out of action, a real threat to our national security. Whereas Yeonpyeong has no significant national security value to South Korea; even without the mutual defense treaty, and the presence of American forces in strength, South Korea would surely not have retaliated by bombing Pyongyang, or whatever our friends here imagine a warlike response might be, and brought on a second Korean War.

But American forces are there in strength, and as long as they remain, South Korea must consider each possible action not just for its political acceptability at home (South Korea is a fully functioning democracy where the people's will counts), but for its effect on relations with its powerful partner. Our presence not only helps to restrain North Korea from invading the South, but to restrain South Korea from rash actions against the North - or to provide its politicians with a rationale for exercising such restraint. (Hence, perhaps, the difference between South Korea's and Israel's responses to attacks from their enemies, though North Korea's having the 4th largest army in the world is doubtless also a factor.)

If the people of South Korea were to take to the streets in numbers demanding war with North Korea, and if they elected a president and legislature who were inclined to war, then we'd really have a dilemma. And if diplomacy failed to get undertakings from the South Korean government not to embark on a preemptive full-fledged war without the "consultation and agreement" with the U.S. required by the mutual defense treaty, despite the importance of the American alliance not just to Korea's security but its prosperity, then I expect either or both countries might well feel obliged to act on Article VI of the treaty (which I didn't quote): "Either Party may terminate [the treaty] one year after notice has been given to the other Party."

But as far as I know, the South Korean people have no such desire to fight a second Korean War, nor does their elected government. And they are all in favor of their American alliance. So we don't face this hypothetical situation now, and I think it's safe to say that we won't for a long time to come. If ever.

[living_stradivarius]

Our presence not only helps to restrain North Korea from invading the South, but to restrain South Korea from rash actions against the North - or to provide its politicians with a rationale for exercising such restraint...

No. Our presence is hardly a source of restraint. If anything, the risk of our absence or departure is what's restraining Seoul. And the single overriding cause for restraint in South Korea is due to the hundreds of North Korean artillery pointed at Seoul. If it weren't for the artillery the South wouldn't hesitate to strike (nor would the US).

[lennygoran]

>And the single overriding cause for restraint in South Korea is due to the hundreds of North Korean artillery pointed at Seoul.<

Talk about riding another overriding factor-- my new Hyandai--I don't need that company or country bombed right now! Regards, Len

[John F]

Our presence not only helps to restrain North Korea from invading the South, but to restrain South Korea from rash actions against the North - or to provide its politicians with a rationale for exercising such restraint...

No. Our presence is hardly a source of restraint. If anything, the risk of our absence or departure is what's restraining Seoul. And the single overriding cause for restraint in South Korea is due to the hundreds of North Korean artillery pointed at Seoul. If it weren't for the artillery the South wouldn't hesitate to strike (nor would the US).

Well, yes, it's not irrelevant that the nation's capital is very close to North Korea. Still, your notion that South Korea would otherwise jump at the chance to start another Korean War is without any basis that I'm aware of. It's the North that's consistently been belligerent, and the South that has by far eht most to lose. As for your other notion, that South Korea is restrained by the possibility that the U.S. forces might leave, this makes no sense at all that I can see. Could you explain your thinking?

[living_stradivarius]

Still, your notion that South Korea would otherwise jump at the chance to start another Korean War is without any basis that I'm aware of. It's the North that's consistently been belligerent, and the South that has by far eht most to lose. As for your other notion, that South Korea is restrained by the possibility that the U.S. forces might leave, this makes no sense at all that I can see. Could you explain your thinking?

Like I said above, it's all about the artillery. No artillery = no threat (nothing to lose) = punish the DPRK regime with impunity. Secondly, the South doesn't see it as another Korean War - 1/ North Korea conventional military technology is wayy behind the times, 2/ a conflict would be framed as a liberation of their brothers and sisters.

[Barry]

You, and we, are getting into contingencies here that go way beyond the case at hand. And I think your observations are too abstract, and may not fit the specifics of South Korean governance and politics, which few of us here know anything about beyond what we can read in Wikipedia. If indeed anybody has taken the trouble - I see little if any evidence of it in this discussion.

Some folks in this discussion have been carrying on as if South Korea were like the United States, and the North's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island were the equivalent of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which precipitated us into World War II. But of course they are quite unlike. The attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't a provocation, it was an act of war aimed at our Pacific fleet and close to putting it out of action, a real threat to our national security. Whereas Yeonpyeong has no significant national security value to South Korea; even without the mutual defense treaty, and the presence of American forces in strength, South Korea would surely not have retaliated by bombing Pyongyang, or whatever our friends here imagine a warlike response might be, and brought on a second Korean War.

The people who make decisions on national security need to take every possible scenario into account before taking action (or at least that's the way it's supposed to work). So I see no problem with looking at various scenarios here.

I'm not sure who you're referring to in the second paragraph, but I think most, if not all of us understand that this is not the equivalent of Pearl Harbor. It's very unlikely that there will be a full-scale war or less than something roughly equal to what the North has already done to the South (even that is unlikely at this point). But the Kim regime is so unpredictable that it's virtually impossible to peg what he'll (or they) do next. Which is why it's interesting to look at conceivable scenarios. If these types of incidents increase in frequency and intensity, obviously the thought process on the part of the South would have to change.

[Barry]

Still, your notion that South Korea would otherwise jump at the chance to start another Korean War is without any basis that I'm aware of. It's the North that's consistently been belligerent, and the South that has by far eht most to lose. As for your other notion, that South Korea is restrained by the possibility that the U.S. forces might leave, this makes no sense at all that I can see. Could you explain your thinking?

Like I said above, it's all about the artillery. No artillery = no threat (nothing to lose) = punish the DPRK regime with impunity. Secondly, the South doesn't see it as another Korean War - 1/ North Korea conventional military technology is wayy behind the times, 2/ a conflict would be framed as a liberation of their brothers and sisters.

You don't consider their nuclear weapons to be a deterrent? I think the Kim regime's unpredictability would have to be taken into account. I really would fear that if they were ever on the verge of being defeated in a conventional war and ousted from power or killed, they'd give serious consideration to using their nukes and might well do it. I can't imagine the South would attack them with impunity without even taking that factor into consideration.

[John F]

Still, your notion that South Korea would otherwise jump at the chance to start another Korean War is without any basis that I'm aware of. It's the North that's consistently been belligerent, and the South that has by far eht most to lose. As for your other notion, that South Korea is restrained by the possibility that the U.S. forces might leave, this makes no sense at all that I can see. Could you explain your thinking?

Like I said above, it's all about the artillery. No artillery = no threat (nothing to lose) = punish the DPRK regime with impunity. Secondly, the South doesn't see it as another Korean War - 1/ North Korea conventional military technology is wayy behind the times, 2/ a conflict would be framed as a liberation of their brothers and sisters.

Again, what basis do you have for this extraordinary belief? Sorry, but it seems to me that you're making it up as you go along.

[John F]

The people who make decisions on national security need to take every possible scenario into account before taking action (or at least that's the way it's supposed to work). So I see no problem with looking at various scenarios here.

(A) they are much better informed than we are, and (B) we have no such responsibility. So I'd rather we kept within the framework of what we do know, and focus on what might possibly actually happen, and not muddy the waters with scenarios that aren't going to. But of course everyone is free to say whatever he/she likes in the Corner Pub, that's one of the things pubs are for.

The Kim regime is so unpredictable that it's virtually impossible to peg what he'll (or they) do next. Which is why it's interesting to look at conceivable scenarios. If these types of incidents increase in frequency and intensity, obviously the thought process on the part of the South would have to change.

Like I said, if North Korea launches an invasion across the DMZ, or bombs or shells Seoul, that would be an outright act of war and all the safety catches would be off. Short of that, increases in frequency of incidents like the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking of the Cheonan are hardly a cause for war. As for an increase in "intensity," I don't know what you mean by that, short of the acts of war I've mentioned.

[John F]

You don't consider their nuclear weapons to be a deterrent? I think the Kim regime's unpredictability would have to be taken into account. I really would fear that if they were ever on the verge of being defeated in a conventional war and ousted from power or killed, they'd give serious consideration to using their nukes and might well do it. I can't imagine the South would attack them with impunity without even taking that factor into consideration.

You beat me to it. But even before North Korea's first successful nuclear test four years ago, the South obviously did not see starting a second Korean War as in its best interests. The notion that this was because of Seoul's vulnerability to conventional artillery, seems to me not only off the mark and indeed off the wall, but also off the point.

[John F]

November 25, 2010

With Limited Options, South Korea Shifts Military Rules
By MARTIN FACKLER and MARK McDONALD

SEOUL, South Korea — Responding to growing public criticism after a deadly North Korean attack, President Lee Myung-bak accepted the resignation of his defense minister on Thursday and announced changes in the military’s rules of engagement to make it easier for South Korea to strike back with greater force, especially if civilians are threatened.

The government also announced plans to increase the number of troops and heavy weapons on Yeonpyeong Island, where two marines and two civilians died Tuesday in an artillery fusillade from the North. On Friday, President Lee appointed a security adviser, Lee Hee-won, as the new defense minister.

But Mr. Lee, who came to office two years ago vowing to get tough with the North, has little maneuvering room in formulating a response. While the attack appears to have pushed anti-North Korean sentiment here to its highest level in years, there is little public support for taking military action against the North that might lead to an escalation of hostilities.

“North Korea has nothing to lose, while we have everything to lose,” said Kang Won-taek, a professor of politics at Seoul National University. “Lee Myung-bak has no choice but to soften his tone to keep this country peaceful. It is not an appealing choice, but it is the only realistic choice.”...

South Korean defenses on five coastal islands in the Yellow Sea had been set up primarily to guard against possible amphibious landings by North Korean troops. Critics said Thursday that the military had not anticipated the possibility of an attack by North Korean artillery batteries, which are reportedly in caves along the North’s coastline.

“Now, an artillery battle has become the new threat, so we’re reassessing the need to strengthen defenses,” Mr. Lee told lawmakers. The new measures he outlined included doubling the number of howitzers and upgrading other weaponry.

The new rules of engagement will be based on whether military or civilian sites are the targets, said Mr. Hong, the presidential spokesman, adding that the move was made to “change the paradigm of responding to North Korea’s provocations.”

Previously, South Korean forces were allowed to respond only in kind — if the North fired artillery, the South could answer only with artillery — to contain any dispute. Now, officials said, the military would be allowed to use greater force....

Mr. Lee and his advisers appear to have concluded that a less confrontational stance is the only way to persuade North Korea to end its provocations. A few analysts speculated that Mr. Lee might eventually end up not far from his liberal predecessors like former President Roh Moo-hyun, who used economic aid to appease the North and reduce tensions on the peninsula.

“Anyone would conclude that the peaceful approach is best to reverse the situation,” said Moon Jung-in, a former adviser in the Roh administration. “A hard-line approach is not a real option.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/26/world ... korea.html

[living_stradivarius]

Still, your notion that South Korea would otherwise jump at the chance to start another Korean War is without any basis that I'm aware of. It's the North that's consistently been belligerent, and the South that has by far eht most to lose. As for your other notion, that South Korea is restrained by the possibility that the U.S. forces might leave, this makes no sense at all that I can see. Could you explain your thinking?

Like I said above, it's all about the artillery. No artillery = no threat (nothing to lose) = punish the DPRK regime with impunity. Secondly, the South doesn't see it as another Korean War - 1/ North Korea conventional military technology is wayy behind the times, 2/ a conflict would be framed as a liberation of their brothers and sisters.

Again, what basis do you have for this extraordinary belief? Sorry, but it seems to me that you're making it up as you go along.

Extraordinary belief? Only if you don't follow the military experts on DPRK. That's why we don't have laymen and politicians determining our military strategy (aside from the Prez). If it weren't for DPRK's artillery pointed at Seoul there would be no North Korea problem.

http://www.cdi.org/north-korea/north-korea-crisis.pdf
II. Surgical Air Strike on Nuclear Facilities
U.S. air strikes upon the North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon were under consideration during the 1993-1994 crises and again the last few months. At the present time, the main objective of such an attack would probably be to stop DPRK use of the plutonium-using reactor at the site, and to prevent its capability to reprocess into weapons grade material the large number of spent plutonium fuel rods stored there. U.S. officials, citing satellite photographs, said on Feb. 26, 2003, that North Korea had restarted the Yongbyon reactor, though there was no evidence the DPRK was reprocessing spent fuel rods. A surgical air strike on the reactor or re-processing facilities would be possible with a high likelihood of success. It is less certain what the long-term consequences of the attack in terms of possible radiation release would be. There is a concern that hitting the reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or the Korean Peninsula itself.17
Lockheed Martin F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighters and Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, using Korean or Japanese staging bases and Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to launch the aircraft, would probably mount the attacks. (Both types are normally stationed only in the continental United States.) If the F-117 were used, staging areas in Korea would be required, as the aircraft only has a 650-mile un-refueled radius of action.18 Six F-117s were deployed by the U.S. Air Force to Kunsan Air Base in South Korea on March 13, 2003. This move was viewed by Pyongyang as a major escalation and a rehearsal for invasion.19
Another possibility, given the F-117s’ relatively limited weapons load – two 2,000-lb (907-kg) precision-guided or unguided bombs – and short range, is the B-2 Spirit bomber. However, given the successful B-2 and F-117 forward deployments directed against Iraq, stealth aircraft could play a key role for any mission in North Korea. The B-2s have an average range over 5,000 miles, with a 16-weapon load out of precision-guided 2,000-lb bombs, and so could operate either from their home base in the United States or from Guam for the mission. The key advantage given by stealth aircraft is that they can penetrate almost any air defense without the electronic warfare jamming and surface-to-air-missile suppression support that would be otherwise required, involving the use of up to 50 other aircraft in some alternative plans. Therefore, it is likely that stealth aircraft and cruise missiles would be a significant part of any initial military confrontation with North Korea.
17
Note: The Air Force recently modified the capability of the B-2 internal smart racks. The smart racks now allow the B-2 to carry 80 Mk 82 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs,) designated GBU-38. The Mk 82 500-lb "lightweight" version of the GPS/inertial-guided JDAM The lightweight JDAM is the newest version of a family of weapons that include the Mk 83 1,000-lb, Mk 84 2,000-lb bombs and BLU-109 2,000-lb penetrator bombs.
Doug Bandow, “N. Korea Is No Place To Apply Iraq ‘Lessons,’”Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2003. 18 Mark Lambert, (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1994-95, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surry, 1994, p.565. 19 International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2003.
North Korea’s air defenses around the Yongbyon site include 22 anti-aircraft gun batteries, and North Korea has its most advanced MiG-29 fighters, a total of 16 aircraft, stationed at the Onchon airbase within the same province.20 However given the overwhelming advantages that U.S. aircrews possess in training, equipment, flying time and experience, it is extremely unlikely that the North Korean military could hinder an attack to any great extent.
Attacking a nuclear site where radioactive material might be spread in the course of the bombing is an inherently risky process. However, William Perry, U.S defense secretary during the earlier 1994 crisis, said plans produced at that time for an attack on the Yongbyon facility would have seen the plant destroyed without releasing radiation into the air through the use of precision- guided bombs.21 Furthermore, the plutonium reprocessing plant, where reactor fuel was converted into weapons material, would have been destroyed as well. If radiation were released during a strike, the prevailing winds from the north and north-west during the winter would push it and any fall-out toward the North Korea capital and largest city, Pyongyang, only 60 miles to the south.22 Pyongyang has a population of over 2.5 million people.
However, an attack on the Yongbyon site would not remove the whole North Korean nuclear threat. This is because the plutonium activities at the Yongbyon site represent only part of the problem. Just as Pyongyang recently asserted, U.S. intelligence judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had fabricated one to two nuclear weapons from Yongbyon material, and that there is also the highly enriched uranium program.23 The location of the postulated nuclear weapons is not publicly known; they are unlikely to be stored at a location the United States might well attack anyway. Bombing the uranium enrichment facilities that make building uranium- based nuclear weapons possible might stop the production of further weapons, but will not remove any currently available weapons from the equation. The United States may not be entirely certain of the location of the uranium enrichment facilities, as Secretary of State Colin Powell said in late December 2002 that the site “had not been determined yet.”24 Even if it has been, all the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment facilities likely are buried underground, which would make such an attack more difficult.25
Escalatory Pressures
The United States would almost certainly wish to eliminate the long-range artillery and rocket threat to Seoul at the same time it undertook any air strike. This would necessitate destruction of several hundred well protected revetments using precision-guided munitions. Unguided ‘dumb’ bombs would not be able to precisely fly through the narrow apertures available. The United States has been working upon this problem for some years, and an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) was mounted on the Peninsula in 1996-97 for this very purpose. The Precision/Rapid Counter – Multiple Rocket Launch ACTD, completed in 1997, apparently successfully developed and demonstrated all weather, day/night “precision deep strike capability” to neutralize the rocket launchers and heavy artillery deployed north of the DMZ.
However, this task faces a number of difficult challenges. U.S. and South Korean commanders on the Peninsula would undoubtedly certainly want the number of precision-guided munition delivery platforms increased, either in the form of aircraft or additional artillery.
Apart from shortages of platforms and weapons, tying together the command, control and communications network required to destroy, on the first try, all the North Korean rocket launchers and heavy artillery without heavy damage to Seoul potentially could be very difficult. Orchestrating all the weapons and sensors involved, without mutual interference among weapons being delivered, could pose major difficulties. Previous attempts to tie together remotely sited weapon systems, such as the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability, faced drawn out teething problems. The command and control network would have to work the first time to save Seoul from tremendous damage.
Further, following any U.S. air strike pressures to mount a more comprehensive attack against North Korea would be strong. The first phase of war could be a massive air and ground artillery campaign to strike all artillery positions along the DMZ, as well as key nodes of command, control and communication. Critical to success would be achieving immediate, overwhelming destruction of the threat at the DMZ. In addition, the North Korean air forces and airfields, integrated air defense zones, command and control facilities, surface-to-air missile sites and anti- aircraft batteries would likely be on the target list the first night. The accuracy and lethality of the current weapon inventory would enable the United States to destroy a considerable number of the high-value targets throughout the country from the air. This strike would be devastatingly lethal and very intense. The goal would be to very quickly take away North Korea’s will to fight and to stagger and isolate remaining DPRK formations, rendering them incapable of resisting.
Another key factor in such ensuring a successful strike would be achieving air dominance within the first 48 to 72 hours. A very robust network of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets to maintain a continuous presence over the battle space would be needed to support the offensive.
One specific scenario could unfold as follows:
Six B-2s each armed with 80 500-lb JDAMs sequentially launch from Guam. The strike is coordinated with several divisions of B-1s with 12 JDAMs per aircraft and F-117s with two laser-guided precision-guided weapons per aircraft, taking off from other bases in the region. These strikes would be deconflicted with the launch of more than 300 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the various cruisers and submarines positioned in the Pacific. Six additional B-2s, flying out of their home base in Missouri, time their arrival closely behind – loaded with 24 1,000-lb JDAMs or 16 2,000-lb JDAMs. One thousand targets could be destroyed prior to sunrise. This would prepare the battleground for ground forces to rapidly sweep to the North under a protective close air support umbrella of tactical aircraft from two carrier battle groups and other aircraft and assault helicopters in the South.
The United States does have the capability to preemptively destroy the artillery and rocket launchers threatening Seoul. However, given the number of North Korean weapons and their protection, such an attempt might well be only partially successful – potentially threatening great harm to the South Korean capital as the DPRK reacts. Moreover, the distinct possibility exists that North Korea would attack first, anticipating a U.S. strike against its artillery and rocket formations near the DMZ.


Also see:
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=SSx ... #v=onepage


http://attackerman.firedoglake.com/2010 ... deterrent/
Unfortunately for the sake of analysis, there are at least three layers of strategic deterrent on display in North Korea, so it’s going to remain difficult to tease out the role played by nuclear weapons. Those layers of deterrence are:
1. Nuclear Weapons
2. The conventional threat to Seoul posed by massed artillery and missiles
3. The Crazy – A fear that the North will attack Japan or do something else entirely unpredictable, with correspondingly unpredictable outcomes.

In order for a nation to actually USE a nuclear weapon, their program must have progressed to the point where it is deliverable, reliable and targetable. In the case of North Korea, their weapon is certainly not deliverable on a missile – early generation nuclear weapons are big and heavy – which leaves them with the delivery options of a suicide mission in a large cargo aircraft or overland delivery behind a massive ground attack. Both methods include a high likelihood that the weapon will be destroyed or damaged before it can be triggered. There are major questions about the reliability of the North’s weapons designs, as the tests do not seem to have produced much in the way of yield. Their targeting options are limited due to the limitations on their delivery options, so it’s reasonable to assume they would target metropolitan Seoul, without any greater concern for accuracy than that.

The North Koreans have been placing artillery, rockets and surface-to-surface missiles around Seoul for at least forty years, building increasingly hardened positions with better air defenses and increasingly deadly firepower. In return, the South Koreans, along with their US allies, have been carefully locating and mapping these positions from satellites and spy planes, deploying their own batteries of artillery and rockets with counter-battery radars and implementing any other methods they can think of to blunt the conventional threat to Seoul, a huge city of over 20 million people. It seems likely at this point that this threat could be reduced fairly quickly, but not before tens if not hundreds of thousands were killed and the city decimated.

There can be no doubt that, to whatever extent Kim Jong-il is capable of striking out in any and all directions if hostilities break out, he can be expected to do so. It’s difficult to gather any meaningful intelligence on what he might choose to do in extremis, so mostly this consideration is a matter of speculation around capabilities. What could be done with the air, naval and missile capabilities of the North, and how best to prevent their use? Most of this speculation centers on attacks on Japan due to geography, but it’s hard to know what other plans this paranoid and dangerous regime might have put in place.

[living_stradivarius]

You don't consider their nuclear weapons to be a deterrent? I think the Kim regime's unpredictability would have to be taken into account. I really would fear that if they were ever on the verge of being defeated in a conventional war and ousted from power or killed, they'd give serious consideration to using their nukes and might well do it. I can't imagine the South would attack them with impunity without even taking that factor into consideration.

You beat me to it. But even before North Korea's first successful nuclear test four years ago, the South obviously did not see starting a second Korean War as in its best interests. The notion that this was because of Seoul's vulnerability to conventional artillery, seems to me not only off the mark and indeed off the wall, but also off the point.

Also:
Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Phillip C. Saunders
http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/dprkmil.htm

Preventing North Korean Retaliation

The biggest military concern in striking North Korean nuclear facilities is the threat of North Korean counter-attacks. Seoul, the South Korean capitol, lies within range of North Korean long-range artillery. Five hundred 170mm Koksan guns and 200 multiple-launch rocket systems could hit Seoul with artillery shells and chemical weapons, causing panic and massive civilian casualties. North Korea has between 500 and 600 Scud missiles that could strike targets throughout South Korea with conventional warheads or chemical weapons. North Korea could hit Japan with its 100 No-dong missiles.[7] Seventy percent of North Korean army ground units are located within 100 miles of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea, positioned to undertake offensive ground operations. These units could fire up to 500,000 artillery rounds per hour against South Korean defenses for several hours.[8] Finally, if North Korea does have one or two deliverable nuclear weapons, nuclear retaliation (or nuclear threats) would also be available to North Korea leaders.

Even if U.S. strikes on North Korea nuclear facilities are successful, North Korea would still have the capability to inflict massive damage against South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops based there. Retaliation might be gradual, or North Korea might resort to large-scale strikes quickly. Efforts to invade the South are less likely, but cannot be ruled out entirely (especially if U.S. military forces are preoccupied in the Persian Gulf). The decision about how to respond would be up to North Korean leaders, who would have a range of military options and the ability to escalate the conflict over time. Although the United States would likely win an all-out war, the damage to South Korea would be tremendous and U.S. forces would sustain large casualties. One U.S. military estimate suggested that U.S. and South Korean military forces might suffer 300,000-500,000 casualties within the first 90 days of fighting, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties.[9]

Given these possible military responses, attacks against North Korean nuclear facilities would need to be accompanied by measures to prevent or limit retaliation, such as efforts to degrade North Korean military capabilities, defend against counter-attacks, and deter military responses.

Because North Korea has a wide range of military means (including artillery, missiles, and ground-force operations) that can inflict significant damage on the South, pre-emptive strikes could not destroy all of North Korea's weapons before they could be used. Pre-emptive strikes against North Korean artillery and missiles would require South Korean cooperation and the deployment of additional U.S. aircraft, reconnaissance assets, and artillery. Counter-battery artillery fire and air strikes could be used to target North Korea artillery, but would be unable to prevent North Korea from doing considerable damage to Seoul. The number and mobility of North Korea artillery pieces and ballistic missile forces make them particularly tough targets. Many North Korean artillery pieces are protected in caves and would be difficult to destroy; North Korean missiles are mounted on mobile launchers that are hard to locate and strike. As mentioned previously, any North Korean nuclear weapons would likely be hidden in hardened underground facilities. Because pre-emptive strikes against North Korean artillery and missiles would require striking targets throughout the country, they would quickly escalate the conflict into a wider war. For this reason, pre-emptive strikes would be unlikely to accompany surgical strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, but would be held in reserve in case North Korea began to retaliate with missile and artillery attacks.

Efforts to reinforce U.S. and South Korean defenses would provide additional protection against a North Korean ground attack, some protection against North Korean missile attacks, and little or no protection against North Korean artillery. The U.S. Army has already deployed some Patriot missile defense batteries in South Korea to protect U.S. troops and airbases. The Patriot would provide some protection against North Korean missile attacks, but it cannot provide wide-area coverage and is unlikely to destroy all incoming North Korean missiles in a concerted attack. North Korean missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads might be able to do considerable damage even if they are successfully intercepted. If Patriot systems were deployed to protect Japan, they would provide only very limited point defense against North Korean No-dong missiles. The only protection against North Korean artillery fire would be to try to destroy individual artillery pieces as quickly as possible.

Because efforts to degrade North Korean military capabilities and defend against attacks could not prevent North Korea from inflicting major damage on South Korean and Japanese targets, the United States would likely focus on deterring Pyongyang from counter-attacking by threatening to escalate the conflict to an unacceptable level of violence. This might include a statement of limited U.S. military objectives in the initial attack on North Korean nuclear facilities, threats to use devastating conventional attacks in response to a major North Korean counter-attack, military deployments to make the threat of conventional retaliation more credible, and explicit threats to use nuclear weapons in response to North Korean retaliation using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Although it would not be necessary militarily, deployment of nuclear weapons to South Korea could be used to signal U.S. willingness to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level.


---------




It's all about the artillery deterrent folks. Always has been since the end of the Korean War until the emergence of the possible nuclear threat. With the artillery out of the way, we have no problem taking out their nuclear facilities and missile delivery systems with surgical air strikes. See the first article I cited. DPRK still doesn't have a viable delivery mechanism for its nuclear weapons that we can't take out. We may not be able to find where the alleged one or two bombs are stored, but we can eliminate all plane, ships, and ground vehicles that attempt to deploy them. The longer we wait, the more we let them develop their delivery mechanisms. I have some more materials on the disproportionate deterrence effect of artillery I can pull up from a course I took with SecDef. William J. Perry in 2006. Dr. Perry advised against a strike against DPRK because of artillery and Chemical Weapons use against Seoul, but what if Seoul were empty?

For the time being combine the analyses from the three articles above. We effectively eliminate the DPRK's nuclear deployment deterrents with US military superiority in surgical strikes. We can't eliminate the artillery deterrent until it has dealt a deathly blow to Seoul. This is why I suggested evacuating Seoul above. Short term economic hit for the elimination of a very dangerous regime. Worth it. Even if lenny has to go without his Hyundai for a little while.

[lennygoran]

>what if Seoul were empty?<

I just don't see how that can be accomplished--and wouldn't the war begin just as soon as the exile began with North Korea immediately striking out? Do you think that if North Korea saw this exile taking place they would then cave in? It's a scary set of reports--can't China bail us out!

>Even if lenny has to go without his Hyundai for a little while.<

No way! Regards, Len